

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1211520-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 156

Page 3 ~ b1; b3;
Page 5 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 6 ~ b1; b3;
Page 7 ~ b1; b3;
Page 9 ~ b1; b3;
Page 10 ~ b1; b3;
Page 11 ~ b1; b3;
Page 12 ~ b1; b3;
Page 13 ~ b1; b3; b7D;
Page 14 ~ b1; b3; b7D;
Page 15 ~ b1; b3; b7D;
Page 16 ~ b1; b3; b7D;
Page 17 ~ b1; b3; b7D;
Page 18 ~ b1; b3; b7D; Referral/Consult;
Page 19 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 20 ~ b1; b3;
Page 23 ~ b1; b3;
Page 24 ~ b3;
Page 27 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 28 ~ b1; b3;
Page 36 ~ b3;
Page 37 ~ b1; b3;
Page 38 ~ b3;
Page 39 ~ b3;
Page 40 ~ b3;
Page 41 ~ b3;
Page 42 ~ b3;
Page 43 ~ b3;
Page 44 ~ b3;
Page 45 ~ b3;
Page 46 ~ b1; b3;
Page 47 ~ b1; b3;
Page 48 ~ b1; b3;
Page 49 ~ b1; b3;
Page 50 ~ b1; b3;
Page 51 ~ b1; b3;
Page 52 ~ b1; b3;
Page 53 ~ b1; b3;
Page 54 ~ b1; b3;
Page 55 ~ b3; Referral/Consult;
Page 56 ~ b3; Referral/Consult;
Page 58 ~ b1; b3; Referral/Consult;
Page 59 ~ b3; Referral/Consult;
Page 60 ~ b1; b3;
Page 61 ~ b1; b3;
Page 62 ~ b1; b3;
Page 63 ~ b1; b3;
Page 64 ~ b1; b3;
Page 65 ~ b3;
Page 66 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 69 ~ b3; Referral/Consult;
Page 70 ~ b1; b3;
Page 71 ~ b1; b3;
Page 73 ~ b1; b3;
Page 74 ~ b1; b3;
Page 75 ~ b1; b3;
Page 76 ~ b1; b3;
Page 77 ~ b1; b3;
Page 78 ~ b1; b3;

Page 79 ~ b1; b3;
Page 80 ~ b1; b3;
Page 81 ~ b1; b3;
Page 82 ~ b1; b3;
Page 83 ~ b1; b3;
Page 84 ~ b1; b3;
Page 85 ~ b1; b3;
Page 86 ~ b1; b3;
Page 87 ~ b1; b3;
Page 88 ~ b1; b3;
Page 89 ~ b1; b3; b7D;
Page 91 ~ b1; b3; b7D; b7E; Referral/Consult;
Page 92 ~ b1; b3; Referral/Consult;
Page 93 ~ b1; b3; b7E; Referral/Consult;
Page 95 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 96 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 97 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 98 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 99 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 100 ~ Referral/Direct;
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Page 142 ~ Referral/Direct;
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Page 149 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 150 ~ Referral/Direct;
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Page 152 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 153 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 154 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 155 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 156 ~ Referral/Direct;
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Page 158 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 159 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 160 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 161 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 162 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 163 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 164 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 165 ~ b1; b3; Referral/Consult;
Page 166 ~ b3; Referral/Consult;
Page 167 ~ b1; b3; Referral/Consult;
Page 170 ~ b1; b3; Referral/Consult;
Page 172 ~ b1; b3; Referral/Consult;
Page 173 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 174 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 177 ~ b1; b3;
Page 179 ~ b1; b3;
Page 180 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 182 ~ b3;
Page 183 ~ b3;
Page 185 ~ b1; b3;
Page 186 ~ b1; b3;

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62-80750-✓ NR 7/7/53
CHANGED TO
Filed as a copy to
64-31870-519

AUG 16 1954

RS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-31-97 BY *SP2 aln/pte*
330,299

August 18, 1954

Mr. Tolson;

RE: LADISLAS FARAGO

George Sokolsky advised me that Ladislas Farago had written a book which he had sold to Funk and Wagnall having to do with an over-all study of espionage. For some unknown reason CIA sent a representative to New York with a view of blocking the publication of this book on the basis that it would serve no useful purpose. George did not know whether this was meeting much resistance with the publishers, but stated that it had become the subject of considerable comment.

L.B. Nichols

LBN:ptm

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-31-97 BY SP2/ALM/ptm
330,299 RER/SEA

62-80750-1
NOT RECORDED
138 SEP 2 1954

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

BOSEP 7 1954

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-3-251-7

Washington

A Remarkable Coincidence In the Cold War

By JAMES RESTON

WASHINGTON, Aug. 14.—The capital saw something new this week—the "surfacing" of a genuine straight-up-and-down Soviet spy, Yuri Alexandrovich Rastvorov or Dmitrovsk.

If you've never been to a "surfacing," it's a little like a launching, only without the champagne. Also it's more mysterious. Invitations were issued suddenly over the telephone about 4 o'clock Friday afternoon.

There would be a "briefing," the man said, at 6:15, at the State Department. Very important. Internationally significant. Couldn't say more. Then he hung up.

Later an Assistant Secretary of State himself called. Don't miss this one, he warned. Big show. At 6 o'clock there were about 200 reporters in the State Department's blue auditorium.

Enter Comrade Rastvorov

Yuri Alexandrovich Rastvorov or Dmitrovsk "surfaced" at precisely 6:43. He came walking in the midst of a highly nervous audience whose members wanted to know if there was any connection between the sudden appearance of Mr. Rastvorov at this time and the "surfacing" earlier in the week of Dr. Otto John, the West German spy chief who skipped to the Communists in East Berlin.

Henry Sydam, the State Department's press officer, was eloquent. Certainly not, he said, is a connection whatsoever. Thus the reporters found themselves in attendance upon the most remarkable coincidence of the cold war.

What Comrade Yuri Alexandrovich Rastvorov then went through was really something. At a regular press conference he more than four Communist Party members associated in the audience at 6:15, but the rule at a "surfacing" seems to be that only one person is permitted to speak.

He spoke in a low, steady voice, and he was accompanied by a woman, a woman who was identified as a member of the Communist Party. He spoke in a low, steady voice, and he was accompanied by a woman, a woman who was identified as a member of the Communist Party.

Was the Soviet Union really so naive? Hadn't been in Moscow for four years. Did he think the United States and the Soviet Union could live in the same world without war? He hoped so. Did he get any information from Americans in Tokyo? No. Did the Soviet Embassy run the Communist party in Japan? No, the Communist party in Moscow ran the Communist party in Japan. What did he know about the activities of the Soviet secret agents in the United States? He didn't know. Tokyo was a long way from the United States.

Improvement Needed

Mr. Rastvorov isn't the first defector from the Soviet spy system and he won't be the last, but if Washington and Moscow are to go on throwing defectors at each other, the art of "surfacing" in Washington has clearly got to be improved.

What has happened here in the last couple of weeks is that the intelligence agency of the Government (the C. I. A.) has moved out of the realm of secret service work and into the realm of public propaganda.

It was upset by the Otto John case. He had been working to some of our highest officials early this summer and he went back to Germany and turned traitor.

The reaction in official Washington was to deny the inspired stories were put out by the capital designed to prove that he had been a spy. Into the East Zone of Berlin, and when American reporters saw him in Berlin and demolished this theory, Rastvorov, who said he had been in this country since last January, was suddenly produced.

This illustrates a comparatively new problem of the cold war. In this fierce struggle with the Communists, the United States must have an effective secret service which does all sorts of things that cannot, in the national interest, be printed. Our spies are captured and our planes shot down from time to time in circumstances that cannot be put into the press without great benefit to the Communist cause.

A New Problem

There is a growing tendency here, not only to expect the press to go beyond its normal functions, but to expect it to do things that are not only unbecoming but also dangerous to the national interest. It is not only unbecoming but also dangerous to the national interest.

There is a growing tendency here, not only to expect the press to go beyond its normal functions, but to expect it to do things that are not only unbecoming but also dangerous to the national interest. It is not only unbecoming but also dangerous to the national interest.

cy jeopardizes the secrets which it must enjoy if it is to operate effectively.

Ever since it was established it has been fighting against Congressional supervision. It has not only rejected Senator McCarthy's efforts to investigate its procedures but has been less than enthusiastic about Senator Mike Mansfield's suggestions that a joint Congressional committee be established like the joint committee on atomic energy to oversee its activities. A good case can be made that the C. I. A. is not doing its job, but Congress is not likely to grant it to an agency that exists on a precarious one day and is making propaganda the next.

NY TIMES
8/15/54

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-31-97 BY SP2 acm/ste
330,299

ENCLOSURE

COVER LETTER FOR BLOCKED MAIL TOO LARGE FOR FILE

~~RECORDED~~

THIS SERIAL IS TOO LARGE FOR FILE AND WILL BE CARRIED AS A NOT RECORDED SERIAL
BEHIND THE FILE

THIS SERIAL THE (Date)

ISSUE OF THE (Name of the pamphlet)

SUBJECT

b3

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-31-97 BY SP2alm/pte
330,299 Rev OSA

FILE NUMBER

62-80750-2389

51 AUG 26 1954¹

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: 8-18-54

FROM : MR. V. P. KEAY

cc Mr. Roach
Mr. PapichSUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Tracy _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____

The Doolittle Committee's examination of CIA is one of a number of attempts to improve CIA. Previous attempts have only resulted in patch work, piecemeal recommendations for improvement without touching on fundamentals. In other words - salves and pills have been used instead of radical surgery.

Fundamentally, the other functions of CIA have overshadowed, slanted, confused, and hindered the work of information gathering. Psychological warfare, guerrilla activities, fomenting of revolutions and so forth have engaged the full energies of the top officials. Obviously, information gathering must be the prelude to all other action and therefore is the most important function. It is hard to see how CIA can effectively and efficiently function in collecting information with its present organization even though it might be possible to vastly improve it.

What is needed is a small, compact, well-trained, tightly disciplined, information-gathering agency entirely separate, apart and out of the control of CIA. Five hundred operatives could cover the world. Even with appropriate supervisory and clerical help, it would be a small budget organization. Its sole concern should be collection of information.

The present CIA should be confined to the specific duties given to it by Statute, that is, coordination, correlation and evaluation of intelligence received from other sources, and such other functions of "common concern" as the President desires to entrust to it outside of information-gathering.

CIA now has the duty of collecting information abroad by virtue of Presidential Directive issued under the provisions of the Statute relating to assigning it functions of "common concern." This function could be taken away from it in the same way and entrusted to an existing agency or a newly created agency.

RECORDED-25

62-80150-2391

EX-128

Doolittle is reputed to be a straightforward, hard driving individual who appears to be close to the President. He might be able to effectuate the needed radical change in spite of the opposition which would be received from the empire building clique in CIA.

VPK:TD

67 AUG 31 1954
SENT DIRECTOR
8-18-54

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-31-92 BY SP-1/1/92
330,299 Rev 01/94

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-101379

MR. BELMONT

It is suggested that in view of the urgency of this matter to the welfare of the United States, if the opportunity occurs during our dealings with the Doolittle Committee we diplomatically drop a suggestion along the above lines.

ADDENDUM - AHB:LL - August 18, 1954

This suggestion has considerable merit. However, a suggestion by us during the conference with General Doolittle could be written up as a recommendation from the Bureau that the structure of CIA be changed along these lines, which appears to be beyond the scope of the Doolittle interview. Therefore, I recommend we do not do it, although I will be glad to drop it into the conversation if desired.

A. H. Belmont

I concur. I have a completely defeatist attitude as to any effective corrective measures which might improve CIA under the present atmosphere of intrigue which encompasses CIA & the State Dept.

I concur
HB
I agree.
pnt.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

FROM : L. B. Nichols

DATE: August 27, 1954

SUBJECT:

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

[REDACTED]

b3

Mr. Belmont thinks there are two possibilities as to who they have in mind, however. Liaison will be exceedingly on the alert to ascertain [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-31-97 BY SP-6 [REDACTED] / rtk

330, 299 Rev OSA

cc: Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont

LBN:MP

*Memo Boardman
8/30/54 - [REDACTED]
J. Edgar Hoover
[REDACTED]*

12 SEP 21 1954

62-80751-2393, 2394
CHANGED TO

62-103214-X1, X2

MAY 28 1956

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-31-97 BY SP2 aln/rte
330,299

C pa
August 17, 1954

Mr. Nichols:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-31-77 BY SP-6/MLP/ste
330,299 Rev BHA

G.I.R.H.6

RE: CIA TECHNICIANS

11
You will recall that the Central Intelligence Agency, with our permission, established a teletype machine in our Communications Section in order to establish direct communications between the FBI and CIA headquarters. The machine not only belongs to CIA but its maintenance and upkeep is handled by CIA technicians. In order for CIA men to work on this machine, it is necessary for them to go into our C^Ode Room down on the fourth floor. 2-1

CIA technicians carry a card, with their picture stamped on the card, and a serial number beneath the picture. A second serial number is on the back of the card. There are no names of any individuals or organizations included on the card. This is supposed to identify the technician as a CIA representative. Prior to the CIA man coming to the FBI to work on the teletype machine, CIA calls over and indicates that one of their men will be over soon to work on the teletype machine. A name is given at that time.

When one of our people go over to CIA, our credentials are not respected. We are issued a special pass and we are then personally escorted to the section or office where our business demands our appearance. We later have to turn in this pass and are escorted out of the building. Aside from the fact that CIA fails to respect our credentials, it is felt we have no security at all under the procedure where CIA sends over their technicians to go into our code room and work on the CIA teletype machine. 7-11

On August 12, 1954, one of their men called over here from CIA and later came over to work on the teletype machine. He had with him at the time only the above-mentioned card. Mr. Wherry and I talked to this man and asked him to produce other proof of his identity which he did in the form of a driver's license and other identifying cards.

This matter has been discussed with the Bureau's liaison man to CIA, Mr. Papich. Papich has been instructed to advise CIA that some better system of identification must be worked out if their technicians expect to continue to gain admittance to our code room. He is currently working out plans with CIA where adequate credentials will be given to their men and a more secure program will be effected. N

30 SEP 10 1954

Memorandum to Belmont
SEP 8-26-54
I thought I would advise you of the above in the event CIA officials call the Bureau regarding this matter. An over-all memorandum will be submitted following completion of administrative matters in CIA.

CDD:arm

C. D. DeLoach

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: September 3, 1954

FROM : R. R. Roach

Classified by

Declassify on: OADR

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

Tolson ✓
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
 Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

On September 2, 1954, [REDACTED] of the CIA
confidentially advised Agent Papich that [REDACTED]

With regard to [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED]

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[REDACTED] feels that [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-31-97 BY SP7 ac/Am

RECORDED - 56

53 SEP 10 1954

INDEXED - 56

EE 8 1954

SECRET

LITTON

b3
(u)
DECLASSIFIED BY SP7 ac/Am
ON 6/26/94 C.A. # 28-1846
per CIA Review of 6/6/94

b3

Memo to Belmont

~~SECRET~~

b3

ACTION:

The above is being submitted for your information.

gms
J. 9-4.
VS

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: August 18, 1954

FROM : R. R. Roach

SUBJECT:

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Ladd
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
 Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

330 299 Rev 2/84
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-31-97 BY [signature]

As you know.

b3

b3

SJP:lw

INDEXED-31

SEP 9 1954

EX - 109

55 SEP 13 1954

SENT DIRECTOR

8-19-54

PERS. FILES

Memo to Belmont

b3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The Bureau conducted an investigation of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] No derogatory information was developed.

ACTION:

You will be informed regarding any further reports received
[REDACTED]

QWV JFH VF
I am not optimistic
as to any results being
obtained as CIA is
too heavily entrenched.
H C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Referral/Consult

Date: August 23, 1954

To:

[Redacted]

DECLASSIFIED BY *Spahr/pte*
ON 12-31-97

330,299 per OGA

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

b6

b7C

Subject:

[Redacted]

Referral/Consult

MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

62-80750-^V

Reference is made to

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

A review of

[Redacted]

Referral/Consult

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Referral/Consult

It is requested that you advise this Bureau

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

- Tolson _____
- Boardman _____
- Nichols _____
- Belmont _____
- Harbo _____
- Mohr _____
- Parsons _____
- Rosen _____
- Tamm _____
- Sizoo _____
- Winterrowd _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Holloman _____
- Gandy _____

WAA:elk

MAILED 5
AUG 23 1954
COMM-FBI

AUG 23 4 48 PM '54

RECEIVED
FBI
HELPER-RECEIVED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

77 SEP 14 1954 253

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: September 1, 1954

FROM : R. R. Roach

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-31-97 BY 330,299 PER [redacted]

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
SURVEY BY THE COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION
OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

The Liaison Section has discreetly endeavored to establish the identities of the key personnel which General Mark Clarke might utilize in connection with the forthcoming survey of CIA operations. On August 25, 1954, [redacted] CIA, confidentially advised Agent Papich that [redacted]

On August 26, 1954, [redacted] of the CIA informed Agent Papich that [redacted]

Bureau files reflect that [redacted]

RECORDED - 109
INDEXED - 109

121-38346-30
80750-2404
9 SEP 9 1954

SJP:bas:ld

SENT DIRECTOR

19-01541214

F 4

b3

Memo to Mr. Belmont
from Mr. Roach

RE: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
SURVEY BY THE COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION
OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (100-398697-35)

b3

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
(100-391691-35)

ACTION:

The above is being submitted for your information.

OB

2 files
19-2

mm

gmm

VR

7-2

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *AB*

DATE: August 26, 1954

FROM : R. R. Roach *RR*SUBJECT: CIA, TECHNICIANS

Tolson _____
 Boardman _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

G. I. R. *2-1*

Reference is made to memorandum dated August 17, 1954, from Mr. DeLoach to Mr. Nichols wherein information was set forth concerning CIA technicians who periodically come to the Bureau for the purpose of inspecting a teletype machine which is used for communication between the Bureau and the CIA. As you know, the machine is CIA property and was installed by that agency. The machine is located in the Bureau's Code Room.

The Bureau has encountered a problem because the CIA technicians who come to the Bureau to inspect the machine have not adequately identified themselves. This is something the Bureau cannot condone, particularly since the machine is located in a most sensitive area.

Liaison Agent Papich has discussed this matter with [redacted] CIA. [redacted] was informed that the Bureau will not permit these technicians to enter the Bureau premises in the future unless adequate identifying data is made available. [redacted] stated that the Bureau certainly had obviously strong grounds for a protest and he would take corrective action. On August 24, 1954, [redacted] advised Agent Papich that he would make available to the Bureau the names of individuals who might have occasion to inspect the teletype machine. Together with the names there will be submitted the numbers of the CIA passes carried by the employees. On the CIA pass is a photograph of the employee. It is believed that the foregoing should be satisfactory since the Communications Section can check the identifying list furnished to the Bureau with the pass presented by the technician.

ACTION:

330 299 REVERA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-31-97 BY [signature]

The Liaison Agent will obtain the list of CIA employees and make such data available to the Communications Section.

SJP:lw

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- Mr. Wherry

Letter from CIA 9/9/54

Letter with identification

SEP 15 1954

RECORDED-61

EX-124

13 SEP 10 1954

WASSINK

62-80750-2406

TO : The Director

September 9, 1954

FROM : L. V. Boardman

SUBJECT:

b3
b7D
b7E

Pursuant to your instructions, there is attached a memorandum on the captioned subject matter to assist you in your discussion with the Attorney General.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. This is for your information.

LW:em
Attachment

COPY/ld

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-5-93 BY SP2222/ptc

162-80750-
NOT RECORDED
176 SEP 17 1954
INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

55 SEP 22 1954

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-27754-182

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: September 13, 1954

FROM : R. R. Roach

SUBJECT:

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
 SURVEY BY THE COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION
 OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT
 SURVEY OF CIA BY GENERAL MARK CLARK

Tolson
 Boardman
 Nichols
 Belmont
 Harbo
 Mohr
 Parsons
 Rosen
 Tamm
 Sizoo
 Winterrowd
 Tele. Room
 Holloman
 Gandy

On September 10, 1954, Allen Dulles, Director of CIA, advised Agent Papich that Major General James G. Christiansen has been selected by General Mark Clarke to head the working committee which will conduct a survey of CIA's operations. You will recall that information received by the Bureau so far has indicated that Clarke's survey will be limited to an examination of CIA's organizational and administrative structure. Dulles has indicated to the Liaison Agent that [REDACTED] b3

A review of the Bureau's files disclosed that General Christiansen was born September 23, 1897, at Portland, Oregon. He graduated from the U. S. Military Academy in 1918 [REDACTED]

(116-134889)

Referral/Consult

The Bureau files carry a clipping from the "Honolulu Star-Bulletin" dated October 30, 1946, which reflects that Major General James G. Christiansen was replaced as the head of the Manila Army forces of the USA by Major General George F. Moore. The article reads that no reason was given for the change but it is stated that General Christiansen had been the target of editorial attacks by Manila newspapers because of alleged poor morale of American soldiers in the Philippines. (62-19253-1900)

ACTION:

The above is being submitted for your information.

SJP:lw

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 1-5-98 BY 2000/0000
 330,299 Rev 0000

RECORDED - 56

INDEXED - 56

SENT DIRECTOR

58 SEP 23 1954

13 SEP 16 1954

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 116-134889-1

62-80750 - ✓ (9-6-54)

CHANGED TO

*filed as copy to original in
116-18315-114*

SEP 20 1954

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-5-98 BY SP200/pte
330,299

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON *part*

DATE: 9/15/54

FROM : Mr. Quinn Tamm

SUBJECT:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-5-98 BY SP-6/MLP/ste.
222 000 000

Tolson ☒
Boardman ☒
Nichols ☒
Belmont ☒
Parsons ☒
Rosen ☒
Tamm ☒
 Sizoo ☒
Winterrowd ☒
Tele. Room ☒
Holloman ☒
Gandy ☒

Referral/Consult

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-39314-2-1

950

DED

12 1954

REC'D PERSONNEL SECTION

ICE

QT:edm

26 13 15 12 PM '54

EVI
RECEIVED - WOMBEVI
RECEIVED - WOMB

29 OCT 5 1954

Referral/Consult

Memorandum for Mr. Quinn Tamm

September 15, 1954

[Redacted]

I thanked [Redacted] for this information and requested
him to advise me [Redacted]

[Redacted]

No action. For information only.

✓
Quinn
Tamm

Rev 240906f

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT:

DATE: September 27, 1954

~~SECRET~~
CA 88-1826
Classified by SP4 [signature]
Declassify on: OADR 11/1/89

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

CA 48-1464
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/27/89 BY SP7 [signature]

On September 24, 1954, [redacted] of the CIA advised Agent

Papich that [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(S)(u)

b3

advised that [redacted]

[redacted]

(S)(u)

b3

[redacted]

ACTION:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-5-98 BY SP7 [signature]
330,299 per OADR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b3

The above is being submitted for your information. The Liaison Agent will continue to follow this matter for the purpose of [redacted]

SJP:mpm

DECLASSIFIED BY SP7 CJC/ALM
ON 6/26/94 CA # 88-1826
PER CIA REVIEW of 6/2/94

RECORDED - 71
62-88750-2410

~~SECRET~~
INDEXED - 71
EX-130

13 SEP 29 1954

66 OCT 4 1954

Papich
LIAISON

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. Rosen

DATE: September 20,
1954

FROM : Mr. C. H. Stanley

b3

SUBJECT:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-5-98 BY SP2ALM/ptc
330,299 Rev 02A

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

O C I, A.

Section 69-G-8 of the Manual of Instructions relating to SGE investigations requires that during a Bureau SGE investigation it is necessary that every person who previously furnished derogatory information to any other Government agency be re-contacted. If upon recontact the person contradicts the information he reportedly furnished the other Government agency, the interviewing Agent must call his attention to the previous information and obtain his comments for any discrepancies involved. The Manual specifically states that when interviewing such individuals the identity of the other Government agency to which he previously furnished information should not be made known to him.

b3

cc: 1 - R. R. Roach

66-6200-140
WLW:bbm:rmb

162 - 750 - ✓
NOT RECORDED
45 OCT 1 1954

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL
ENR. S...

50 OCT 6 1954

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-6200-140

RECOMMENDATION:

Liaison Section contact an appropriate official of CIA explaining the Bureau's policy with respect to interviews of individuals who contradict derogatory information they previously reported to other Government agencies and advise CIA the Bureau will continue to follow this policy and will not identify CIA to such persons.

ل. س. ج. ج. ل. س.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: September 22, 1954

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Nichols	_____
Belmont	_____
Harbo	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Sizoo	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT:

O C I A

Reference is made to memorandum from Mr. Stanley to Mr. Rosen dated September 20, 1954, requesting that Liaison contact CIA

On September 21 CIA, was contacted by Liaison Agent Bates. was advised that during a Bureau Security of Government Employees investigation all persons who previously furnished derogatory information to another Government agency are re-contacted. If contradictory information is then given by this person the Agent must call his attention to the previous information furnished and obtain his comments on any discrepancies involved. The identity of the other Government agency is not furnished to the individual.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-5-98 BY 330298 PWD/STW

ACTION:

This memorandum should be furnished to the Employment Security Section of the Investigative Division.

OCT 13 1954

1 - Mr. W. L. Walsh

NOT RECORDED
45 OCT 1 1954

INITIALS

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66

62-80750-247

62-80750-2413
CHANGED TO
62-103214-X3

MAY 28 1956

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a

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-98 BY SP2 [signature]
330,399

TO : A [redacted] ECT

DATE: September 27, 1954

FROM : SA REGIS L. KENNEDY

SUBJECT: [redacted]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C.
GRAND BALLROOM
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1954

[redacted] delivered a prepared address [redacted]

ACTION:

None. For information.

RLK:ez

V. K. [unclear]

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. Boardman	✓
Mr. Nichols	✓
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Harbo	✓
Mr. Mohr	✓
Mr. Parsons	✓
Mr. Rosen	✓
Mr. Tamm	✓
Mr. Sizoo	✓
Mr. Winterrowd	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Mr. Holloman	✓
Miss Gandy	✓

[unclear]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-5-98 BY 330,299 [unclear]
330,299 [unclear]

RECORDED-89

INDEXED-89

EX-103

62-40750-2415

50 OCT 12 1954

NOV 1 1954